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Buying CAFTA: Congressional Leaders Offered a Pork Payoff to Those Who Abandoned Their Principles By W. James Antle III CAFTA was the toughest sell on Capitol Hill of any multilateral trade agreement in recent memory... "FREE TRADE ISN'T FREE" has long been a favorite slogan of economic nationalists. Supporters of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) seem to have adopted it themselves. Congressman Ron Paul's (R- Texas) office has estimated that the pork-barrel projects and other deals struck in order to secure the agreement's passage will end up costing taxpayers at least $50 billion. CAFTA was the toughest sell on Capitol Hill of any multilateral trade agreement in recent memory. It passed the House by just 217 to 215, making it possible to argue that virtually every supporter cast the deciding vote, only after the leadership extended voting nearly an hour beyond the normal 15-minute time limit The Senate approved CAFTA by 55 to 45, the lowest margin ever recorded in that body for a free-trade agreement. House Majority Whip Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) described the notoriously pork-laden $286.4 billion transportation bill as being "very effective" in lining up recalcitrant Republicans. Senate and House Republican leaders held off a final vote on the bill until CAFTA's fate had been decided. The president also helped when he backed off his threat to veto the highway bill if it contained too many extraneous projects, and Bush made a rare trip to the Capitol to sway reluctant congressmen. Sen. Christopher Bond (R-Mo.) was one beneficiary. He announced that he was "more comfortable" voting for CAFTA after he had won $2.5 billion for his home state to build dams and locks along the Mississippi River. Those who bucked the White House and the leadership on CAFTA in some cases had their projects fare less well. Congressmen Virgil Goode (R-Va.) and Walter Jones (R-N.C.), two of the most vocal GOP opponents, saw the final House-Senate conference report slash their high-priority highway projects by 70 percent compared to the version that had passed the House. Although there have been denials that these cuts were a consequence of their anti-CAFTA votes, a spokesman for Congressman Blunt acknowledged to National Journal that other Republicans had been more muted in their opposition to the pact "and there's no question that type of approach was appreciated." Some members sought less tangible benefits than bridges, dams, and trade protections for their local industries. Congressman Robin Hayes (R-N.C. ) told reporters that he was "flat-out, completely, horizontally opposed" and that CAFTA "was not in the interests of the constituents I represent." He initially voted no, but after last-minute pressure from the GOP leadership he switched his voted in exchange for assurances that they would try to shield him from the political consequences. House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-DL) made unspecified promises to do whatever was possible to help Hayes's district keep jobs. Hayes has claimed to have extracted from the Bush administration a guarantee to enforce textile protections and back a new Hong Kong Customs Enforcement pact. Sens. Sax by Chambliss (R-Ga.) and Norm Coleman (R-Minn. ) cut a deal to sway senators from sugar states. Under its; terms, the Bush administration would preserve a 1.5 million ton cap on sugar imports used to support domestic prices. Sugar in excess of the cap would be bought by the Department of Agriculture, which would convert it into ethanol rather than use it for food. Yet there are questions about whether some of these members will ever get anything in return for their bargains. Public Citizen, a D.C.-based organization that opposed CAFTA, has looked at 90 such deals conducted between 1992 and 2004. Their conclusion: administrations of both parties have reneged on about 80 percent of them. "They're really nondeals," says Todd Tucker, research director for Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch. "They won't come to pass." Tucker and his colleagues have compiled a list of likely "non-deals." Congressman Robert Aderholt (R-Ata.) boasts; that his congressional district is the "sock capital." He was leaning against CAFTA, calling it a "job-killer" and an "outsourcing agreement." The administration won his vote by promising to seek a modification to the agreement pertaining to sock tariffs. Instead of occurring immediately, tariffs on socks imported from our CAFTA trading partners would be phased out gradually over 10 years. But no other CAFTA country has indicated that they are willing to agree to the modification Aderholt seeks. The administration is not even legally bound to lobby them. Congressman Steve LaTourette (R-Ohio) was another likely CAFTA opponent the leadership prevailed upon to switch sides. The Cleveland Republican said he changed his mind for the good of furniture makers in his district. He argued that CAFTA contained an 8 percent tariff cut on plywood imports. This would make it cheaper for furniture makers to use plywood and help them create new jobs. LaTourette claimed his vote would "make the difference between them "making stuff in America or not. ". CAFTA opponents, however, countered that LaTourette had been duped. Plywood imports from most CAFTA countries had already been duty-free for 10 years under other existing trade agreements. Thus there was no benefit to offset the potential job losses to his district under the trade pact. When did free-trade deals, which are sold on the grounds of competition, less government, and opening up markets, become such logrolling sessions? The CAFTA debate seemingly hinged on selective protections, subsidies, and tax payer-funded projects going to supporters' districts. Congressman Paul, who voted against CAFTA despite his own support for free trade, called the process by which it was passed "embarrassing." "These kinds of agreements really have very little to do with trade," argues Tucker. "Instead of simplifying trade rules, they are thousands of pages long." Observers suggest that this process may become familiar. If public support for CAFTA-style agreements continues to wane, we could see even bigger outbreaks of arm-twisting and taxpayer funded promise-making in the future. "These trade deals are unpopular and getting more unpopular all the time," says Tucker. "CAFTA , is a relatively minor agreement, economically speaking. It's all just a precursor to the Free Trade of the Americas Act. " If this is the case, free trade may start getting rather more expensive. Articles: Reflections On General Electric's Global Strategy |
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